@article{21c246ee855b4ec8a0f426d14cefe860,
title = "On equilibrium threshold strategies when choosing between observable and unobservable queues",
abstract = "We consider threshold equilibrium strategies in a two-server memoryless queueing system where customers inspect one queue before deciding which queue to join. We show that such an equilibrium may not exist. A numerical study indicates that if threshold equilibria exist, the effective arrival rate to the unobserved queue is higher when the regime there is last-come first-served rather than first-come first-served.",
keywords = "Nash equilibrium, Queueing, Strategic behavior",
author = "Nimrod Dvir and Refael Hassin and Moshe Haviv",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2022",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2022.08.004",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "50",
pages = "555--560",
journal = "Operations Research Letters",
issn = "0167-6377",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "5",
}