On equilibrium threshold strategies when choosing between observable and unobservable queues

Nimrod Dvir, Refael Hassin*, Moshe Haviv

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider threshold equilibrium strategies in a two-server memoryless queueing system where customers inspect one queue before deciding which queue to join. We show that such an equilibrium may not exist. A numerical study indicates that if threshold equilibria exist, the effective arrival rate to the unobserved queue is higher when the regime there is last-come first-served rather than first-come first-served.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)555-560
Number of pages6
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume50
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2022

Funding

FundersFunder number
Israel Science Foundation1571/19, 1512/19

    Keywords

    • Nash equilibrium
    • Queueing
    • Strategic behavior

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'On equilibrium threshold strategies when choosing between observable and unobservable queues'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this