TY - GEN
T1 - Non-malleable Codes for Bounded Parallel-Time Tampering
AU - Dachman-Soled, Dana
AU - Komargodski, Ilan
AU - Pass, Rafael
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, International Association for Cryptologic Research.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Non-malleable codes allow one to encode data in such a way that once a codeword is being tampered with, the modified codeword is either an encoding of the original message, or a completely unrelated one. Since the introduction of this notion by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS ’10 and J. ACM ’18), there has been a large body of works realizing such coding schemes secure against various classes of tampering functions. It is well known that there is no efficient non-malleable code secure against all polynomial size tampering functions. Nevertheless, no code which is non-malleable for bounded polynomial size attackers is known and obtaining such a code has been a major open problem. We present the first construction of a non-malleable code secure against all polynomial size tampering functions that have bounded parallel time. This is an even larger class than all bounded polynomial size functions. In particular, this class includes all functions in non-uniform NC (and much more). Our construction is in the plain model (i.e., no trusted setup) and relies on several cryptographic assumptions such as keyless hash functions, time-lock puzzles, as well as other standard assumptions. Additionally, our construction has several appealing properties: the complexity of encoding is independent of the class of tampering functions and we can obtain (sub-)exponentially small error.
AB - Non-malleable codes allow one to encode data in such a way that once a codeword is being tampered with, the modified codeword is either an encoding of the original message, or a completely unrelated one. Since the introduction of this notion by Dziembowski, Pietrzak, and Wichs (ICS ’10 and J. ACM ’18), there has been a large body of works realizing such coding schemes secure against various classes of tampering functions. It is well known that there is no efficient non-malleable code secure against all polynomial size tampering functions. Nevertheless, no code which is non-malleable for bounded polynomial size attackers is known and obtaining such a code has been a major open problem. We present the first construction of a non-malleable code secure against all polynomial size tampering functions that have bounded parallel time. This is an even larger class than all bounded polynomial size functions. In particular, this class includes all functions in non-uniform NC (and much more). Our construction is in the plain model (i.e., no trusted setup) and relies on several cryptographic assumptions such as keyless hash functions, time-lock puzzles, as well as other standard assumptions. Additionally, our construction has several appealing properties: the complexity of encoding is independent of the class of tampering functions and we can obtain (sub-)exponentially small error.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85115331983&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_18
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_18
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AN - SCOPUS:85115331983
SN - 9783030842512
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 535
EP - 565
BT - Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2021 - 41st Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2021, Proceedings
A2 - Malkin, Tal
A2 - Peikert, Chris
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
T2 - 41st Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2021
Y2 - 16 August 2021 through 20 August 2021
ER -