Network interconnection with competitive transit

David Gilo; Yossi Spiegel

doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.009

Network interconnection with competitive transit

David Gilo^*, Yossi Spiegel

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two local exchange carriers (LECs)) and a third network (e.g., an interexchange carrier (IXC)) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network's customer base.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	439-458
Number of pages	20
Journal	Information Economics and Policy
Volume	16
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.009
State	Published - Sep 2004

Keywords

Access pricing
Bill and keep
Interconnection
Telecommunication
Transit

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10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.009

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title = "Network interconnection with competitive transit",

abstract = "We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two local exchange carriers (LECs)) and a third network (e.g., an interexchange carrier (IXC)) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network's customer base.",

keywords = "Access pricing, Bill and keep, Interconnection, Telecommunication, Transit",

author = "David Gilo and Yossi Spiegel",

note = "Funding Information: For helpful comments we thank Martin Peitz, Tommaso Valletti and seminar participants at Tel Aviv University, the 2003 SAET conference on current trends in Economics in Rodos, and the 2003 NET Institute conference at Stern/NYU. The financial assistance of the Henry Crown Institute of Business Research in Israel and the NET Institute is gratefully acknowledged.",

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AU - Spiegel, Yossi

N1 - Funding Information: For helpful comments we thank Martin Peitz, Tommaso Valletti and seminar participants at Tel Aviv University, the 2003 SAET conference on current trends in Economics in Rodos, and the 2003 NET Institute conference at Stern/NYU. The financial assistance of the Henry Crown Institute of Business Research in Israel and the NET Institute is gratefully acknowledged.

PY - 2004/9

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N2 - We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two local exchange carriers (LECs)) and a third network (e.g., an interexchange carrier (IXC)) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network's customer base.

AB - We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two local exchange carriers (LECs)) and a third network (e.g., an interexchange carrier (IXC)) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network's customer base.

KW - Access pricing

KW - Bill and keep

KW - Interconnection

KW - Telecommunication

KW - Transit

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VL - 16

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EP - 458

JO - Information Economics and Policy

JF - Information Economics and Policy

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Network interconnection with competitive transit

Abstract

Keywords

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