@article{99f8998ab3674ff3b0bf67fb6ac16991,
title = "Network interconnection with competitive transit",
abstract = "We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two local exchange carriers (LECs)) and a third network (e.g., an interexchange carrier (IXC)) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network's customer base.",
keywords = "Access pricing, Bill and keep, Interconnection, Telecommunication, Transit",
author = "David Gilo and Yossi Spiegel",
note = "Funding Information: For helpful comments we thank Martin Peitz, Tommaso Valletti and seminar participants at Tel Aviv University, the 2003 SAET conference on current trends in Economics in Rodos, and the 2003 NET Institute conference at Stern/NYU. The financial assistance of the Henry Crown Institute of Business Research in Israel and the NET Institute is gratefully acknowledged.",
year = "2004",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.009",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "16",
pages = "439--458",
journal = "Information Economics and Policy",
issn = "0167-6245",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "3",
}