Network competition and access charge rules

Toker Doganoglu, Yair Tauman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper presents a model of two competing local telecommunications networks which are mandated to interconnect. After negotiating the access charges, the companies engage in price competition. Given the prices, each consumer selects a network and determines the consumption of phone calls. Using a discrete/continuous consumer choice model, it is shown that a pure strategy equilibrium exists quite generally and satisfies desirable properties. This equilibrium can be implemented by a simple rule that sets the access charges at a common discount from the retail prices. It requires no information and the discount factor is chosen by the companies through negotiations. Finally, if the networks are highly substitute, the retail prices obtained by imposing this rule will approximate the efficient prices.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)16-35
Number of pages20
JournalManchester School
Volume70
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2002
Externally publishedYes

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