Negotiation as a Form of Persuasion: Arguments in First Offers

Yossi Maaravi, Yoav Ganzach, Asya Pazy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In this article we examined aspects of negotiation within a persuasion framework. Specifically, we investigated how the provision of arguments that justified the first offer in a negotiation affected the behavior of the parties, namely, how it influenced counteroffers and settlement prices. In a series of 4 experiments and 2 pilot studies, we demonstrated that when the generation of counterarguments was easy, negotiators who did not add arguments to their first offers achieved superior results compared with negotiators who used arguments to justify their first offer. We hypothesized and provided evidence that adding arguments to a first offer was likely to cause the responding party to search for counterarguments, and this, in turn, led him or her to present counteroffers that were further away from the first offer.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)245-255
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Personality and Social Psychology
Volume101
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2011

Keywords

  • Arguments
  • First offers
  • Negotiation
  • Persuasion

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