TY - JOUR
T1 - Nash and correlated equilibria
T2 - Some complexity considerations
AU - Gilboa, Itzhak
AU - Zemel, Eitan
PY - 1989/3
Y1 - 1989/3
N2 - This paper deals with the complexity of computing Nash and correlated equilibria for a finite game in normal form. We examine the problems of checking the existence of equilibria satisfying a certain condition, such as "Given a game G and a number r, is there a Nash (correlated) equilibrium of G in which all players obtain an expected payoff of at least r?" or "Is there a unique Nash (correlated) equilibrium in G?" etc. We show that such problems are typically "hard" (NP-hard) for Nash equilibria but "easy" (polynomial) for correlated equilibria.
AB - This paper deals with the complexity of computing Nash and correlated equilibria for a finite game in normal form. We examine the problems of checking the existence of equilibria satisfying a certain condition, such as "Given a game G and a number r, is there a Nash (correlated) equilibrium of G in which all players obtain an expected payoff of at least r?" or "Is there a unique Nash (correlated) equilibrium in G?" etc. We show that such problems are typically "hard" (NP-hard) for Nash equilibria but "easy" (polynomial) for correlated equilibria.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=45249127547&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90006-7
DO - 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90006-7
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???
AN - SCOPUS:45249127547
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 1
SP - 80
EP - 93
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -