Abstract
Motivated by the growing discussion on the resemblance of multilevel marketing schemes to pyramid scams, we compare the two phenomena based on their underlying compensation structures. We show that a company can design a pyramid scam to exploit a network of agents with coarse beliefs and that this requires the company to charge the participants a license fee and pay them a recruitment commission for each of the people that they recruit and that their recruits recruit. We characterize the schemes that maximize a company's profit when it faces fully rational agents, and establish that the company never finds it profitable to charge them a license fee or pay them recruitment commissions.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 633-668 |
Number of pages | 36 |
Journal | Theoretical Economics |
Volume | 18 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2023 |
Keywords
- D84
- D85
- D86
- Multilevel marketing
- analogy-based expectations
- misspecified models
- pyramid schemes
- speculative trade