Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions

Jacob Glazer*, Ariel Rubinstein

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

34 Scopus citations

Abstract

A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two "cultures." In one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by aprivate motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the first culture, every mechanism will have an equilibrium which does not achieve the public target, whereas the second culture gives rise to a mechanism whose unique equilibrium outcome does achieve the public target. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D71.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)157-173
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume79
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1998

Funding

FundersFunder number
Institute for Business Research in Israel
United States - Israel Binational Agricultural Research and Development Fund1011-341

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this