Mood implicatures: A logical way of doing generative pragmatics

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Abstract

In this paper we present an extension of the model-theoretic framework of semantics in which some pragmatical aspects of natural language can be treated adequately. In ch.l we specify the scope of generative pragmatics. Ch. 2 outlines the formal framework of semantics. In ch. 3 we pose the problem of non-indicative sentences and in chs. 4 and 5 we reject the solutions suggested by Stenius, Aquist and Lewis. In ch. 6 we define some pragmatical concepts—preconditions and implicatures of various types—using them in ch. 7 to present a pragmatical characterization of moods in terms of preference-implicatures. Some ramifications are discussed. In ch. 8 we draw a distinction between basic preference-implicatures (“pragmemes”) and derived ones. The derivations involve communication rules. In ch. 9 we outline the extended formal framework. Finally, in ch. 10, we present some open questions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)6-38
Number of pages33
JournalTheoretical Linguistics
Volume1
Issue number1-3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1974

Funding

FundersFunder number
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

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