TY - JOUR
T1 - Mixed bundling auctions
AU - Jehiel, Philippe
AU - Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
AU - Moldovanu, Benny
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors are grateful for financial support from the Max Planck Research Prize. We wish to thank Paul Milgrom, the Associate Editor and three referees for helpful comments that greatly improved the paper. Jehiel and Moldovanu wish to thank Ennio Stacchetti for many insightful discussions that shaped some of the ideas presented here.
PY - 2007/5
Y1 - 2007/5
N2 - We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.
AB - We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.
KW - Auction
KW - Mixed bundling
KW - Revenue maximization
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34247116852&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.001
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AN - SCOPUS:34247116852
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 134
SP - 494
EP - 512
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -