Mixed bundling auctions

Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Benny Moldovanu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)494-512
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume134
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2007
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Auction
  • Mixed bundling
  • Revenue maximization

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