Migration-induced redistribution with and without migrants’ voting

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We are motivated by the unique migration experience of Israel, of a supply-side shock triggering skilled immigration and the concurrent decline in welfare-state redistribution. This paper develops a model that can provide an explanation for the mechanism through which a supply-side shock, triggering high-skill migration, can also reshape the politicaleconomy balance and the redistributive policies. The paper highlights the differences in the political-economy-based redistribution policies between the cases in which migrants participate in the electoral system and the case in which they do not. When migrants are allowed to vote, and take advantage of this right, then, all income groups gain (in their net income), except the low-skilled immigrants, who lose. However, when migrants are not allowed to vote, or choose not to participate in elections, all income groups gain, except the skilled migrants who lose.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)158-172
Number of pages15
Issue number1
StatePublished - Mar 2018


FundersFunder number
Sapir Center for Development
Tel-Aviv University
Tel Aviv University


    • Gainers and losers
    • Immigration episode as a “natural experiment”
    • Majority voting
    • Progressivity of the welfare state


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