Markovian persuasion with two states

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan*, Penélope Hernández, Zvika Neeman, Eilon Solan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper addresses the question of how to best communicate information over time in order to influence an agent's belief and induced actions in a model with a binary state of the world that evolves according to a Markov process, and with a finite number of actions. We characterize the sender's optimal message strategy in the limit, as the length of each period decreases to zero. We show that the limit optimal strategy is myopic for beliefs smaller than the invariant distribution of the underlying Markov process. For beliefs larger than the invariant distribution, the optimal policy is more elaborate and involves both silence and splitting of the receiver's beliefs; it is not myopic.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)292-314
Number of pages23
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Nov 2023


FundersFunder number
Spanish Ministry of Economics and Innovation211/22, 1465/18, PID2021-128228NB-I00
Generalitat ValencianaAICO/2021/257
Israel Science Foundation217/17, 722/18
Conselleria de Innovación, Universidades, Ciencia y Sociedad Digital, Generalitat Valenciana


    • Bayesian persuasion
    • Information design
    • Markov games
    • Repeated games with incomplete information


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