Market making with discrete prices

V. Ravi Anshuman*, Avner Kalay

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

55 Scopus citations

Abstract

Exchange-mandated discrete pricing restrictions create a wedge between the underlying equilibrium price and the observed price. This wedge permits a competitive market maker to realize economic profits that could help recoup fixed costs. The optimal tick size that maximizes the expected profits of the market maker can be equal to $1/8 for reasonable parameter values. The optimal tick size is decreasing in the degree of adverse selection. Discreteness per se can cause time-varying bid-ask spreads, asymmetric commissions, and market breakdowns. Discreteness, which imposes additional transaction costs, reduces the value of private information. Liquidity traders can benefit under certain conditions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-109
Number of pages29
JournalReview of Financial Studies
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1998

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