Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The paper investigates two interrelated problems. The first is the output choice of a firm in which decisions are made cooperatively by managers who might have conflicting objectives. The second is the managerial incentives scheme as a strategic choice of owners who wish to maximize profits. Using an example in which a duopolistic market is studied, the paper shows that giving managers incentives that combine profit and sales maximization might be the dominant strategy for the owners.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)245-253
Number of pages9
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume3
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1985
Externally publishedYes

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