Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment

Chaim Fershtman

doi:10.1016/0167-7187(85)90007-4

Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment

Chaim Fershtman^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

159 Scopus citations

Abstract

The paper investigates two interrelated problems. The first is the output choice of a firm in which decisions are made cooperatively by managers who might have conflicting objectives. The second is the managerial incentives scheme as a strategic choice of owners who wish to maximize profits. Using an example in which a duopolistic market is studied, the paper shows that giving managers incentives that combine profit and sales maximization might be the dominant strategy for the owners.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	245-253
Number of pages	9
Journal	International Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume	3
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-7187(85)90007-4
State	Published - Jun 1985
Externally published	Yes

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10.1016/0167-7187(85)90007-4

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Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment

Abstract

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