@article{3fc8ac624d88450fa47763674f140978,
title = "Managerial incentives and the international organization of production",
abstract = "We develop a model in which the heterogeneous firms in an industry choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume that the principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our main result concerns the sorting of firms with different productivity levels into different organizational forms. We use the model to examine the implications of falling trade costs for the relevant prevalence of outsourcing and foreign direct investment (FDI).",
keywords = "Direct foreign investment, Intra-firm trade, Outsourcing, Theory of the firm",
author = "Grossman, {Gene M.} and Elhanan Helpman",
note = "Funding Information: We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu, Pol Antr{\`a}s, Oliver Hart, Jean Tirole, the editor of this journal, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions and to the National Science Foundation for financial support.",
year = "2004",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00072-2",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "63",
pages = "237--262",
journal = "Journal of International Economics",
issn = "0022-1996",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
number = "2",
}