Making statements and approval voting

Enriqueta Aragones*, Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Weiss

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections than a comparable system with plurality rule.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)461-472
Number of pages12
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume71
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 2011

Funding

FundersFunder number
Israel Science Foundation975/03
Sixth Framework Programme
Ministerio de Ciencia y TecnologíaSEC2003-01961, CIT-2-CT-2004-506084

    Keywords

    • Approval voting
    • Turnout

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