Majority vote following a debate

Itzhak Gilboa; Nicolas Vieille

doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9

Majority vote following a debate

Itzhak Gilboa^*, Nicolas Vieille

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	115-125
Number of pages	11
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	23
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0243-9
State	Published - Aug 2004

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Majority vote following a debate

Abstract

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