Majority vote following a debate

Itzhak Gilboa*, Nicolas Vieille

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)115-125
Number of pages11
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - Aug 2004


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