Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non-observable actions

E. Lehrer

doi:10.1007/BF01248496

Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non-observable actions

E. Lehrer^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Northwestern University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

38 Scopus citations

Abstract

We characterize, by the one-shot game terms, the set of lower equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted repeated game with non-observable actions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	57-89
Number of pages	33
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	18
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01248496
State	Published - Mar 1989
Externally published	Yes

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Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non-observable actions

Abstract

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