Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions

Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Aner Sela*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study first-price auctions with n bidders where bidders' types (valuations for the object) are drawn independently according to heterogeneous distribution functions. We show a relation between the distributions of high types and their equilibrium bids. On the other hand, we show that there is no relation between the distributions of types and equilibrium bids of low types, i.e. the equilibrium bids of low types are invariable.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)283-287
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume75
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2002

Keywords

  • Asymmetric auctions
  • First-price auctions

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