Abstract
It seems obvious that our beliefs are logically imperfect in two ways: they are neither deductively closed nor logically consistent. But this common-sense truism has been judged erroneous by some philosophers in the light of various arguments. In defence of common sense I consider and rebut interpretative arguments for logical perfection and show that the assumption espoused by common sense is theoretically superior, and capable - unlike its rival - of accounting for the informativeness of mathematics. Finally, I suggest that common sense opens the way to genuine disputes about the correct logic.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 3-18 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | International Journal of Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2001 |
Keywords
- Interpretation
- Knowledge
- Logic
- Mathematics