Logical knowledge

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


It seems obvious that our beliefs are logically imperfect in two ways: they are neither deductively closed nor logically consistent. But this common-sense truism has been judged erroneous by some philosophers in the light of various arguments. In defence of common sense I consider and rebut interpretative arguments for logical perfection and show that the assumption espoused by common sense is theoretically superior, and capable - unlike its rival - of accounting for the informativeness of mathematics. Finally, I suggest that common sense opens the way to genuine disputes about the correct logic.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3-18
Number of pages16
JournalInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2001


  • Interpretation
  • Knowledge
  • Logic
  • Mathematics


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