Localhost detour from public to private networks: Vulnerabilities and mitigations

Dor Israeli*, Alon Noy, Yehuda Afek, Anat Bremler-Barr

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper presents a new localhost browser based vulnerability and corresponding attack that opens the door to new attacks on private networks and local devices. We show that this new vulnerability may put hundreds of millions of internet users and their IoT devices at risk. We demonstrate the viability of the attack on a real product, "Folding@Home", of which we did a responsible disclosure of the specific vulnerability. Following the attack presentation, we suggest three new protection mechanisms to mitigate this vulnerability, across the different entities of the attack (broswer, localhost server, and attacked IOT). This new attack bypasses recently suggested protection mechanisms designed to stop browser-based attacks on private devices and local applications (Chromium and Rigoudy 2021, Afek et al. 2019), of which we also did a responsible disclosure.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)597-620
Number of pages24
JournalCryptography and Communications
Volume17
Issue number3
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2024

Funding

FundersFunder number
Blavatnik Family Fund
Blavatnik Family Foundation
Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center
International Committee of the Red Cross
Tel Aviv University

    Keywords

    • Browser based attack
    • IoT
    • Localhost
    • Private network

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