License auctions and market structure

Heidrun C. Hoppe, Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We analyze the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several potential entrants. The focus is on the competitiveness induced by the number of auctioned licenses. Under plausible conditions, we show that auctioning more licenses need not result in a more competitive final outcome, contrary to what common sense suggests. This is due to the nature of competition among incumbents, which sometimes exhibits free-riding. We illustrate some results with examples drawn from the recent European license-auctions for third generation (3G) mobile telephony.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)371-396
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Economics and Management Strategy
Volume15
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2006
Externally publishedYes

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