Leakage-tolerant interactive protocols

Nir Bitansky*, Ran Canetti, Shai Halevi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


We put forth a framework for expressing security requirements from interactive protocols in the presence of arbitrary leakage. The framework allows capturing different levels of leakage-tolerance of protocols, namely the preservation (or degradation) of security, under coordinated attacks that include various forms of leakage from the secret states of participating components. The framework extends the universally composable (UC) security framework. We also prove a variant of the UC theorem that enables modular design and analysis of protocols even in face of general, non-modular leakage. We then construct leakage-tolerant protocols for basic tasks, such as secure message transmission, message authentication, commitment, oblivious transfer and zero-knowledge. A central component in several of our constructions is the observation that resilience to adaptive party corruptions (in some strong sense) implies leakage-tolerance in an essentially optimal way.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTheory of Cryptography - 9th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2012, Proceedings
Number of pages19
StatePublished - 2012
Event9th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2012 - Taormina, Sicily, Italy
Duration: 19 Mar 201221 Mar 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7194 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference9th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2012
CityTaormina, Sicily


Dive into the research topics of 'Leakage-tolerant interactive protocols'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this