Leakage-tolerant computation with input-independent preprocessing

Nir Bitansky, Dana Dachman-Soled, Huijia Lin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review


Following a rich line of research on leakage-resilient cryptography, [Garg, Jain, and Sahai, CRYPTO11] and [Bitansky, Canetti, and Halevi, TCC12] initiated the study of secure interactive protocols in the presence of arbitrary leakage. They put forth notions of leakage tolerance for zero-knowledge and general secure multi-party computation that aim at capturing the best-possible security when the private inputs of honest parties are exposed to direct leakage. So far, only a handful of specific two-party functionalities have been successfully realized under the notion. General functionalities were only realized under weaker security notions [Boyle, Garg, Jain, Kalai, and Sahai, Crypto13], or relying on leakage-immune input-processing, which needs to be repeated for each and every execution [Boyle, Goldwasser, Jain, Kalai, STOC12]. We construct leakage-tolerant multi-party computation protocols for general functions, relying on input-independent preprocessing that is performed once and for-all. The protocols tolerate continual leakage, throughout an unbounded number of executions, provided that leakage is bounded within any particular execution. In the malicious setting, we also require a common reference string, and a constant fraction of honest parties. At the core of our construction, is a tight connection between secure compilers in the Only-Computation-Leaks (OCL) model and leakage-tolerant protocols. In particular, we show that two-party leakage-tolerant protocols with input-independent preprocessing are essentially equivalent to two-component OCL compilers satisfying certain strong properties. We then show how to construct such strong OCL compilers in the plain model, with the help of O(1) auxliary components.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 2014 - 34th Annual Cryptology Conference, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages18
EditionPART 2
ISBN (Print)9783662443804
StatePublished - 2014
Event34rd Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2014 - Santa Barbara, CA, United States
Duration: 17 Aug 201421 Aug 2014

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
NumberPART 2
Volume8617 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference34rd Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2014
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySanta Barbara, CA


FundersFunder number
International Business Machines Corporation


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