TY - JOUR
T1 - Kant on the Experience of Time and Pure Imagination
AU - Senderowicz, Yaron
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Kant officially argues that the role of the representation of time in the synthetic a priori judgments of arithmetic and the general theory of motion implies that time must be an a priori condition of intuition. In this paper, I claim that the ideality of the representation of time is independently supported also by Kant’s explanation of the possibility of temporal experience. I show that two suppositions motivate Kant’s claim that time cannot be a determination of outer appearances and that it must rather belong to inners sense. According to Kant, sensations are momentary states, and parts of time exist in succession. I demonstrate that similar suppositions underlie Locke’s account of the empirical acquisition of the ideas of succession and duration that influenced Kant’s discussion. I then single out the flaws in Locke’s theory. I clarify why given Locke and Kant’s suppositions, the representation of time cannot originate from perceiving in inner sense a stream of motionless ideas, as Locke supposed. Locke’s account does not involve memory. Nevertheless, in the final section I clarify why given the aforementioned suppositions, the representation of time cannot originate also from memory. It must originate from pure imagination.
AB - Kant officially argues that the role of the representation of time in the synthetic a priori judgments of arithmetic and the general theory of motion implies that time must be an a priori condition of intuition. In this paper, I claim that the ideality of the representation of time is independently supported also by Kant’s explanation of the possibility of temporal experience. I show that two suppositions motivate Kant’s claim that time cannot be a determination of outer appearances and that it must rather belong to inners sense. According to Kant, sensations are momentary states, and parts of time exist in succession. I demonstrate that similar suppositions underlie Locke’s account of the empirical acquisition of the ideas of succession and duration that influenced Kant’s discussion. I then single out the flaws in Locke’s theory. I clarify why given Locke and Kant’s suppositions, the representation of time cannot originate from perceiving in inner sense a stream of motionless ideas, as Locke supposed. Locke’s account does not involve memory. Nevertheless, in the final section I clarify why given the aforementioned suppositions, the representation of time cannot originate also from memory. It must originate from pure imagination.
KW - Kant
KW - locke
KW - pure imagination
KW - temporal experience
KW - time consciousness
KW - transcendental idealism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85130837833&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09672559.2022.2079147
DO - 10.1080/09672559.2022.2079147
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AN - SCOPUS:85130837833
SN - 0967-2559
VL - 30
SP - 144
EP - 161
JO - International Journal of Philosophical Studies
JF - International Journal of Philosophical Studies
IS - 2
ER -