Joint games and compatibility

Hirbod Assa*, Sheridon Elliston, Ehud Lehrer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We introduce the concepts of joint games and compatibility. In a joint game, members of the grand coalition have the option to split and participate in different underlying games, thereby maximizing their total worths. In order to determine whether the grand coalition will remain intact, we introduce the notion of compatibility of these games. A set of games is compatible if the core of the joint game is non-empty. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)91-113
Number of pages23
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2016


  • Compatibility
  • Concave integral
  • Cooperative games
  • Core
  • Joint game


Dive into the research topics of 'Joint games and compatibility'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this