Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept

Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts - most notably Nash equilibrium - predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. We introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the name suggests, iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIJCAI-09 - Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages153-158
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781577354260
StatePublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes
Event21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2009 - Pasadena, United States
Duration: 11 Jul 200916 Jul 2009

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2009
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPasadena
Period11/07/0916/07/09

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