Informational externalities and emergence of consensus

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan*, Nicolas Vieille

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)979-994
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jul 2009


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