TY - JOUR
T1 - Informational externalities and emergence of consensus
AU - Rosenberg, Dinah
AU - Solan, Eilon
AU - Vieille, Nicolas
N1 - Funding Information:
✩ This research was supported by a grant from the Ministry of Science and Technology, Israel, and the Ministry of Research, France. We thank Ehud Lehrer for the comments he provided. * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: dinah@zeus.math.univ-paris13.fr (D. Rosenberg), eilons@post.tau.ac.il (E. Solan), vieille@hec.fr (N. Vieille).
PY - 2009/7
Y1 - 2009/7
N2 - We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement.
AB - We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=67349139188&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.027
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.027
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AN - SCOPUS:67349139188
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 66
SP - 979
EP - 994
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -