Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

Kfir Eliaz, Françoise Forges*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)167-170
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2015


  • Cournot duopoly
  • Information structure
  • Verifiable information


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