@article{5a36c69177894246af6fc96cd224d29b,
title = "Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists",
abstract = "We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.",
keywords = "Cournot duopoly, Information structure, Verifiable information",
author = "Kfir Eliaz and Fran{\c c}oise Forges",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2014 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2015",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006",
language = "אנגלית",
volume = "126",
pages = "167--170",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
}