Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

Kfir Eliaz; Françoise Forges

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006

Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

Kfir Eliaz, Françoise Forges^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We show that in a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with unknown demand, the optimal information disclosure policy of an informed benevolent planner is to fully inform one of the duopolists and disclose no information to the other one. We discuss possible extensions of the result.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	167-170
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	126
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006
State	Published - 1 Jan 2015

Keywords

Cournot duopoly
Information structure
Verifiable information

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006

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Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists

Abstract

Keywords

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