Information dependent games. Can common sense be common knowledge?

Itzhak Gilboa; David Schmeidler

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5

Information dependent games. Can common sense be common knowledge?

Itzhak Gilboa^*, David Schmeidler

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	215-221
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	27
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5
State	Published - 1988
Externally published	Yes

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10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5

Cite this

@article{463d43b8b42a4dcf8a1e53131bebb92c,

title = "Information dependent games. Can common sense be common knowledge?",

abstract = "This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.",

author = "Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler",

year = "1988",

doi = "10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5",

language = "אנגלית",

volume = "27",

pages = "215--221",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",