Information dependent games. Can common sense be common knowledge?

Itzhak Gilboa*, David Schmeidler

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic game-theoretic axioms. Two by-products are the introduction of information-dependent games, and a formal treatment of the framework of game theoretic axioms. In this setup a version of the Surprise Test Paradox is used to prove that common sense cannot be common knowledge.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)215-221
Number of pages7
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1988
Externally publishedYes


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