Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers

Souvik Ghosh*, Refael Hassin

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper summarizes the literature on efficiency loss when agents selfishly optimize their utility in stochastic queueing systems. The price of anarchy is the most popular measure for quantifying this loss, but we also discuss other measures. The queueing models are introduced briefly and results on the loss of efficiency are discussed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-11
Number of pages11
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume295
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 16 Nov 2021

Funding

FundersFunder number
Israel Science Foundation1571/19

    Keywords

    • Braess paradox
    • Measure of efficiency
    • Non-cooperative games
    • Price of anarchy
    • Queueing

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