Incentivizing Organ Donor Registrations with Organ Allocation Priority

Avraham Stoler, Judd B. Kessler, Tamar Ashkenazi, Alvin E. Roth, Jacob Lavee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

How donor organs are allocated for transplant can affect their scarcity. In 2008, Israel's Parliament passed an Organ Transplantation Law granting priority on organ donor waiting lists to individuals who had previously registered as organ donors. Beginning in November 2010, public awareness campaigns advertised the priority policy to the public. Since April 2012, priority has been added to the routine medical criteria in organ allocation decisions. We evaluate the introduction of priority for registered organ donors using Israeli data on organ donor registration from 1992 to 2013. We find that registrations increased when information about the priority law was made widely available. We find an even larger increase in registration rates in the 2 months leading up to a program deadline, after which priority would only be granted with a 3-year delay. We also find that the registration rate responds positively to public awareness campaigns, to the ease of registration (i.e. allowing for registering online and by phone) and to an election drive that included placing registration opportunities in central voting locations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)500-510
Number of pages11
JournalHealth Economics (United Kingdom)
Volume26
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2017

Keywords

  • incentive for organ donation
  • organ allocation
  • organ donation
  • organ transplantation
  • transplant law

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