Incentives' effect in influenza vaccination policy

Dan Yamin, Arieh Gavious

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In the majority of developed countries, the level of influenza vaccination coverage in all age groups is suboptimal. Hence, the authorities offer different kinds of incentives for people to become vaccinated such as subsidizing immunization or placing immunization centers in malls to make the process more accessible. We built a theoretical epidemiological game model to find the optimal incentive for vaccination and the corresponding expected level of vaccination coverage. The model was supported by survey data from questionnaires about people's perceptions about influenza and the vaccination against it. Results suggest that the optimal magnitude of the incentives should be greater when less contagious seasonal strains of influenza are involved and greater for the nonelderly population rather than the elderly, and should rise as high as $57 per vaccinated individual so that all children between the ages of six months and four years will be vaccinated.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2667-2686
Number of pages20
JournalManagement Science
Volume59
Issue number12
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2013
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Economic epidemiology
  • Game theory
  • Incentive
  • Influenza vaccination
  • SIR model

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