TY - JOUR
T1 - Incentive-compatible advertising on nonretail platforms
AU - Eliaz, Kfir
AU - Spiegler, Ran
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Authors. The RAND Journal of Economics published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The RAND Corporation
PY - 2020/6/1
Y1 - 2020/6/1
N2 - Nonretail platforms enable users to engage in noncommercial activities, while generating user information that helps ad targeting. We present a model in which the platform chooses a personalized ad-display rule and an advertising fee (which depends on the targeted user group). The policy that maximizes the platform's advertising revenues creates an incentive for advertisers to strategize targeting. We provide a condition for incentive-compatibility of the first-best policy, and highlight the forces that make it harder to satisfy. We apply our result to examples of platforms. Our analysis of social networks turns out to be related to the “community-detection” problem.
AB - Nonretail platforms enable users to engage in noncommercial activities, while generating user information that helps ad targeting. We present a model in which the platform chooses a personalized ad-display rule and an advertising fee (which depends on the targeted user group). The policy that maximizes the platform's advertising revenues creates an incentive for advertisers to strategize targeting. We provide a condition for incentive-compatibility of the first-best policy, and highlight the forces that make it harder to satisfy. We apply our result to examples of platforms. Our analysis of social networks turns out to be related to the “community-detection” problem.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85085995286&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/1756-2171.12316
DO - 10.1111/1756-2171.12316
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AN - SCOPUS:85085995286
SN - 0741-6261
VL - 51
SP - 323
EP - 345
JO - RAND Journal of Economics
JF - RAND Journal of Economics
IS - 2
ER -