Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion

Nitsan Perach, Uriel G. Rothblum

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


A case study of matching students with dormitory-groups at the Technion lead recently to the study of a variant of the stable matching model with a "qualifying criterion" for the inclusion of a student among those getting an assignment. A notion of stability was introduced for the model and a (student-courting) algorithm which finds a matching that satisfied this criterion and has desired properties was described. Here, we show that students cannot benefit from misrepresenting preferences in an extension of the model that allows dormitory-groups to have different preferences over students and allows these preferences to be incomplete.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)657-667
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number4
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes


  • Dormitory assignment
  • Incentive compatibility
  • Stable matching


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