How to be an uncompromising revisionary ontologist

David Mark Kovacs*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


Revisionary ontologies seem to go against our common sense convictions about which material objects exist. These views face the so-called Problem of Reasonableness: they have to explain why reasonable people don’t seem to accept the true ontology. Most approaches to this problem treat the mismatch between the ontological truth and ordinary belief as superficial or not even real. By contrast, I propose what I call the “uncompromising solution”. First, I argue that our beliefs about material objects were influenced by evolutionary forces that were independent of the ontological truth. Second, I draw an analogy between the Problem of Reasonableness and the New Evil Demon Problem and argue that the revisionary ontologist can always find a positive epistemic status to characterize ordinary people’s beliefs about material objects. Finally, I address the worry that the evolutionary component of my story also threatens to undermine the best arguments for revisionary ontologies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2129-2152
Number of pages24
Issue number3
StatePublished - Mar 2021


FundersFunder number
2017 Eastern APA in Baltimore
Helsingin Yliopisto
National University of Singapore
University of Haifa
Bilkent Üniversitesi


    • Debunking
    • Material objects
    • New Evil Demon Problem
    • Nihilism
    • Organicism
    • Problem of Reasonableness
    • Revisionary ontology
    • Universalism


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