Abstract
Determining whether or not an agent is conscious of a bit of information relevant to action requires first that we can determine if an agent is conscious of a given bit of information, which by itself is challenging. In addition, we have to be able to tag that bit of information as being “relevant to action.” This chapter reviews some of the neuroscience and philosophy behind perceptual “content consciousness” and some of the key considerations involved in measuring neural information and determining its subjective status. One of those key considerations is determining (or deciding) what qualifies a bit of information as relevant to action. The chapter proposes a hypothetical empirical approach to the question posed which remains an open and active research question.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Free Will |
Subtitle of host publication | Philosophers and Neuroscientists in Conversation |
Editors | Uri Maoz, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong |
Place of Publication | New York |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Chapter | 24 |
Pages | 213-221 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780197572153 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2022 |
Keywords
- information
- consciousness
- action
- neuroimaging
- report