Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge

Adam Brandenburger, Eddie Dekel

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Game-theoretic analysis often leads to consideration of an infinite hierarchy of beliefs for each player. Harsanyi suggested that such a hierarchy of beliefs could be summarized in a single entity, called the player's type. This chapter provides an elementary construction, complementary to the construction already given in the paper by Mertens and Zamir (1985), of Harsanyi's notion of a type. It is shown that if a player's type is coherent then it induces a belief over the types of the other players. Imposing common knowledge of coherency closes the model of beliefs. We go on to discuss the question that often arises as to the sense in which the structure of a game-theoretic model is, or can be assumed to be, common knowledge.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationWorld Scientific Series in Economic Theory
EditorsAdam Brandenburger
PublisherWorld Scientific
Pages31-41
Number of pages11
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2023

Publication series

NameWorld Scientific Series in Economic Theory
Volume5
ISSN (Print)2251-2071

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