Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study the set of limit points of equilibrium payoffs in n-player repeated games, with bounded recall, when the memory capacities of all the players grow to infinity. Two main issues are explored: (i) whether differential information enables players to play correlatively, and (ii) the extent to which boundedly rational players can learn others′ behavior patterns and conceal their own. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 026.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)390-405
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume7
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1994

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