Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma

Ariel Rubinstein*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

375 Scopus citations

Abstract

The paper studies two-person supergames. Each player is restricted to carry out his strategies by finite automata. A player's aim is to maximize his average payoff and subject to that, to minimize the number of states of his machine. A solution is defined as a pair of machines in which the choice of machine is optimal for each player at every stage of the game. Several properties of the solution are studied and are applied to the repeated prisoner's dilemma. In particular it is shown that cooperation cannot be the outcome of a solution of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)83-96
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume39
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1986
Externally publishedYes

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