TY - JOUR
T1 - Finite and infinite complexity in axioms of rational choice or Sen's characterization of preference-compatibility cannot be improved
AU - Beja, Avraham
PY - 1989/12
Y1 - 1989/12
N2 - Axioms of rational choice are said to have "infinite complexity" if the consistency condition that they posit deals simultaneously not only with pairs, triples, or even arbitrarily large finite collections of decisions, but with infinite collections as well. This short note gives a proof that a characterization of the choice functions which are compatible with an underlying system of pairwise preferences must include an infinite complexity axiom, provided decision sets are not necessarily finite and the underlying preferences not necessarily a complete order.
AB - Axioms of rational choice are said to have "infinite complexity" if the consistency condition that they posit deals simultaneously not only with pairs, triples, or even arbitrarily large finite collections of decisions, but with infinite collections as well. This short note gives a proof that a characterization of the choice functions which are compatible with an underlying system of pairwise preferences must include an infinite complexity axiom, provided decision sets are not necessarily finite and the underlying preferences not necessarily a complete order.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=45249129625&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90086-0
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90086-0
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AN - SCOPUS:45249129625
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 49
SP - 339
EP - 346
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -