Abstract
This article summarizes the economic approach to marriage and divorce. The economic gains from marriage arise from sharing and coordination. Durable and mutual care help to support efficient outcomes. The gains from marriage and their division influence the decisions to marry and to stay married. Competition in the marriage market determines who will marry whom and the division of the gains. Complementary marital traits lead to a positive assortative matching. Frictions and search explain why, in any given moment in time, part of the population is single and why individuals enter into imperfect unions that dissolve when a better match is found or an unanticipated shock occurs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences: Second Edition |
| Publisher | Elsevier Inc. |
| Pages | 829-834 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780080970875 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780080970868 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 26 Mar 2015 |
Keywords
- Children
- Divorce
- Efficiency
- Equilibrium
- Frictions
- Marriage
- Matching
- Power
- Search
- Traits
- Transfers
- Wages
- Work