TY - JOUR
T1 - Existence of equilibrium for walrasian endowment games
AU - Safra, Zvi
N1 - Funding Information:
*The author is deeply indebted to Hans Halter and William Thomson for helpful discussions and especially to Andreu Mas-Colell whose advice had significantly improved the paper. The financial support of Yad Avi Ha-yishuv and the generous hospitality of Harvard University are gratefully acknowledged.
PY - 1985/12
Y1 - 1985/12
N2 - This work deals with no-destruction Walrasian endowment games, where agents can manipulate by declaring false initial endowments. The existence theorem of non-trivial Nash equilibrium (NE) for large economies is the main purpose of the paper. This theorem also implies (1) the existence of nontrivial NE for Walrasian preference games, and (2) the existence of NE allocations which are almost efficient. It is also shown that under some regularity conditions, and when the economy gets large, every sequence of NE allocations converges to a true Walrasian allocation.
AB - This work deals with no-destruction Walrasian endowment games, where agents can manipulate by declaring false initial endowments. The existence theorem of non-trivial Nash equilibrium (NE) for large economies is the main purpose of the paper. This theorem also implies (1) the existence of nontrivial NE for Walrasian preference games, and (2) the existence of NE allocations which are almost efficient. It is also shown that under some regularity conditions, and when the economy gets large, every sequence of NE allocations converges to a true Walrasian allocation.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0007182018&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90097-3
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90097-3
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontojournal.article???
AN - SCOPUS:0007182018
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 37
SP - 366
EP - 378
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -