Existence of equilibrium for walrasian endowment games

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This work deals with no-destruction Walrasian endowment games, where agents can manipulate by declaring false initial endowments. The existence theorem of non-trivial Nash equilibrium (NE) for large economies is the main purpose of the paper. This theorem also implies (1) the existence of nontrivial NE for Walrasian preference games, and (2) the existence of NE allocations which are almost efficient. It is also shown that under some regularity conditions, and when the economy gets large, every sequence of NE allocations converges to a true Walrasian allocation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)366-378
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Dec 1985


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