TY - JOUR
T1 - Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
AU - Neeman, Zvika
AU - Pavlov, Gregory
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to thank Eddie Dekel, Françoise Forges, Maria Goltsman, Johannes Hörner, Bart Lipman, Dilip Mookherjee, Michel Poitevin, Pasquale Schiraldi and the seminar participants at Arizona State University, Boston University, the Hebrew University, Université de Montréal, Tel Aviv University, Toulouse, Vienna, University of Western Ontario, CETC (Montreal, 2007), Decentralization conference (Ann Arbor, 2007), World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Evanston, 2008), and mechanism design conference (Bonn, 2009) for helpful comments and conversations. We are also grateful to the editor and three anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments. Neemanʼs research was supported in part by the ISF and by the Google Inter-university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions . All remaining errors are ours.
PY - 2013/3
Y1 - 2013/3
N2 - We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced Groves allocations are EPRP implementable, while with three or more agents - all ex post efficient allocations are. In environments with independent private values essentially only the budget balanced "Groves in expectations" allocations are EPRP implementable, while with three or more agents and correlated beliefs - all ex post efficient allocations are.
AB - We study what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are ex post renegotiation-proof (EPRP), i.e., robust against the possibility of ex post renegotiation under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions are EPRP implementable. In complete information environments with two agents only budget balanced Groves allocations are EPRP implementable, while with three or more agents - all ex post efficient allocations are. In environments with independent private values essentially only the budget balanced "Groves in expectations" allocations are EPRP implementable, while with three or more agents and correlated beliefs - all ex post efficient allocations are.
KW - Ex post renegotiation
KW - Implementation
KW - Mechanism design
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84875374479&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2012.08.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2012.08.003
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AN - SCOPUS:84875374479
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 148
SP - 473
EP - 501
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -