TY - JOUR
T1 - Evolutionary and continuous stability
AU - Eshel, Ilan
N1 - Funding Information:
I wish to thank Professor Samuel Karlin and Professor Marcus Feldman stimulating discussions, and helpful remarks on the manuscript. This work was partially supported by NIH grants SROl GM10452-17 GM28016-02, and NSF grant MCS79-24310.
PY - 1983/7/7
Y1 - 1983/7/7
N2 - A strategy in a population game is evolutionarily stable if, when adopted by large enough a majority in the population, it becomes advantageous against any mutant strategy. It is said to be continuously stable if, when the majority slightly deviates from it, some reduction of this deviation becomes individually advantageous. This definition is meaningful if a continuum of (pure) strategies is available to each individual in the population. For that case, a necessary and a sufficient condition for an evolutionary stable strategy being a continuously stable strategy is analyzed.
AB - A strategy in a population game is evolutionarily stable if, when adopted by large enough a majority in the population, it becomes advantageous against any mutant strategy. It is said to be continuously stable if, when the majority slightly deviates from it, some reduction of this deviation becomes individually advantageous. This definition is meaningful if a continuum of (pure) strategies is available to each individual in the population. For that case, a necessary and a sufficient condition for an evolutionary stable strategy being a continuously stable strategy is analyzed.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0020957188&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0022-5193(83)90201-1
DO - 10.1016/0022-5193(83)90201-1
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AN - SCOPUS:0020957188
SN - 0022-5193
VL - 103
SP - 99
EP - 111
JO - Journal of Theoretical Biology
JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology
IS - 1
ER -