Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences

Douglas Blair*, Eitan Muller

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The restricted domains of individuals' preferences that permit the construction of Arrow social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures in which each of n voters has some power are characterized. In this context a domain is the Cartesian product of n sets of strict preference orderings. Variants of this result are obtained under the additional requirement of neutrality and in the case when alternatives are vectors whose ith components affect only the ith voter. Kalai and Muller's analogous result (J. Econ. Theory 16 (1977), 457-469) concerning nondictatorial procedures is discussed and proved as a corollary to the main theorem.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)34-53
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jun 1983
Externally publishedYes


Dive into the research topics of 'Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this