Equilibrium strategies for queues with impatient customers

Refael Hassin*, Moshe Haviv

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider a memoryless queue in which the reward of service completion for an individual reduces to zero after some time. Customers, while comparing expected holding costs and the rewards have to decide if to join the system at all and if they do when to renege. We show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in which each of the customers joins with some probability and reneges as soon as the reward is zero.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)41-45
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1995

Keywords

  • Balking and reneging
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Queues

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