Equilibria of War and Peace: Diverse Options of Cooperation

Uri Weiss*, Joseph Agassi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


A repeated game without communication between players is in Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to change strategy unilaterally. Game-theoretical equilibrium is different. It occurs when no player sees incentives to change strategy unilaterally. A game may be in Nash equilibrium and not in game-theoretical equilibrium due to mistaken judgment. The advantage of Nash equilibrium over game-theoretical one is obvious. The advantage of game-theoretical equilibrium over Nash equilibrium is this. A mistaken move is commoner than the choice of the best move available. Considerations of both kinds bring game theory nearer to Wald’s decision theory.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationStudies in Systems, Decision and Control
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Number of pages15
StatePublished - 2023

Publication series

NameStudies in Systems, Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)2198-4182
ISSN (Electronic)2198-4190


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