TY - CHAP
T1 - Equilibria of War and Peace
T2 - Diverse Options of Cooperation
AU - Weiss, Uri
AU - Agassi, Joseph
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - A repeated game without communication between players is in Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to change strategy unilaterally. Game-theoretical equilibrium is different. It occurs when no player sees incentives to change strategy unilaterally. A game may be in Nash equilibrium and not in game-theoretical equilibrium due to mistaken judgment. The advantage of Nash equilibrium over game-theoretical one is obvious. The advantage of game-theoretical equilibrium over Nash equilibrium is this. A mistaken move is commoner than the choice of the best move available. Considerations of both kinds bring game theory nearer to Wald’s decision theory.
AB - A repeated game without communication between players is in Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to change strategy unilaterally. Game-theoretical equilibrium is different. It occurs when no player sees incentives to change strategy unilaterally. A game may be in Nash equilibrium and not in game-theoretical equilibrium due to mistaken judgment. The advantage of Nash equilibrium over game-theoretical one is obvious. The advantage of game-theoretical equilibrium over Nash equilibrium is this. A mistaken move is commoner than the choice of the best move available. Considerations of both kinds bring game theory nearer to Wald’s decision theory.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85159939333&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-27601-9_9
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-27601-9_9
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AN - SCOPUS:85159939333
T3 - Studies in Systems, Decision and Control
SP - 157
EP - 171
BT - Studies in Systems, Decision and Control
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
ER -