Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni*, David Schmeidler

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We define a new notion of equilibrium for nonatomic anonymous games, termed ε-estimated equilibrium, and prove its existence for any positive ε. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. Our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973), pointed out by Shapley.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)110-131
Number of pages22
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Sep 2022


  • Berk-Nash equilibrium
  • Large games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Nonatomic games
  • Peer-confirming equilibrium
  • Self-confirming equilibrium


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