TY - CHAP
T1 - Epistemic Game Theory
AU - Dekel, Eddie
AU - Siniscalchi, Marciano
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks: what do different notions of rationality and different assumptions about what players believe about.. .what others believe about the rationality of players imply regarding play in a game? Being explicit about these assumptions can be important, because solution concepts are often motivated intuitively in terms of players' beliefs and their rationality; however, the epistemic analysis may show limitations in these intuitions, reveal what additional assumptions are hidden in the informal arguments, clarify the concepts or show how the intuitions can be generalized. A further premise of this chapter is that the primitives of the model- namely, the hierarchies of beliefs-should be elicitable, at least in principle. Building upon explicit assumptions about elicitable primitives, we present classical and recent developments in epistemic game theory and provide characterizations of a nonexhaustive, but wide, range of solution concepts.
AB - Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks: what do different notions of rationality and different assumptions about what players believe about.. .what others believe about the rationality of players imply regarding play in a game? Being explicit about these assumptions can be important, because solution concepts are often motivated intuitively in terms of players' beliefs and their rationality; however, the epistemic analysis may show limitations in these intuitions, reveal what additional assumptions are hidden in the informal arguments, clarify the concepts or show how the intuitions can be generalized. A further premise of this chapter is that the primitives of the model- namely, the hierarchies of beliefs-should be elicitable, at least in principle. Building upon explicit assumptions about elicitable primitives, we present classical and recent developments in epistemic game theory and provide characterizations of a nonexhaustive, but wide, range of solution concepts.
KW - Backward induction
KW - Common-prior assumption
KW - Conditional probability systems
KW - Epistemic game theory
KW - Forward induction
KW - Hierarchies of beliefs
KW - Interactive epistemology
KW - Lexicographic probability systems
KW - Rationalizability
KW - Solution concepts
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84922426314&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00012-4
DO - 10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00012-4
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AN - SCOPUS:84922426314
T3 - Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
SP - 619
EP - 702
BT - Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
PB - Elsevier B.V.
ER -